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PUBLIC LAW 280 AND THE INDIAN
GAMING REGULATORY ACT: COULD TWO
WRONGS EVER BE MADE INTO A RIGHT?
DANIEL TWETfEN
As central North America gradually became the United
States and the United States gradually became a world military
and political leader, Indians were marginalized, killed, and
cheated.' Yet the United States recognized in its Constitution
the unique position of tribes.2 Within sixty years of the birth of
the United States, its highest court pronounced tribes "distinct
communit[ies], occupying [their] own territory '3 and named
the federal government caretakers of the natives it had dis-
placed and brutalized.4
J.D. candidate Northwestern University School of Law, 2001. The author would
like to thank Adam Hellegers and Livia McCammon Kiser for their perceptive edit-
ing.
I See HowARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1-21; 124-146
(1995). Professor Zinn illustrates the brutal treatment of Indians both during colo-
nial times and during the first century of the United States' existence.
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This is the "Indian Commerce Clause," which serves
two functions-it provides Congress with power to regulate Indian affairs and it recog-
nizes tribes as political entities distinct from state and federal governments.
3Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
4Id. This trust responsibility has two features. The first feature is the autonomy
between tribes and the federal government. One author describes the federal gov-
ernment's original trust responsibility as "a special legal relationship between an In-
dian tribe and the federal government, in which the tribe is legally separate and
independent from state and local political entities." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS 352-53 (James Olson ed.) (1997). This trust responsibility
eroded in the second half of the 19"' century, but was reborn in the 1930s when "the
tribes regained their statutory authority as trustees of the federal government who
were free from the powers of state and local governmental entities." Id. at 353. The
second aspect of the trust responsibility is that it is the burden of the federal govern-
ment to care for the tribes and the tribes' resources; that is, the tribes are like chil-
dren to be protected by the United States. See Worcester, 31 U.S. 515. This "trust
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In discharging its duty to care for the tribes, the federal
government struck a balance with tribes regarding tribal justice
systems. After the passage of the Major Crimes Act in 1885,5 the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, through the Courts of Indian Of-
fenses,6 maintained jurisdiction over major crimes committed
on Indian lands. Tribes retained exclusive jurisdiction over
lesser crimes and exercised concurrent jurisdiction over many
of the major crimes.7  However, Congress wiped out this ar-
rangement in 1953 when it passed Public Law 280,8 granting to
six states exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes committed in In-
dian country in those states.
9
Public Law 280 created many problems for tribal justice sys-
tems, ultimately resulting in higher crime rates for tribes in Pub-
lic Law 280 states than for tribes in non-Public Law 280 states.
10
As Carol Goldberg-Ambrose, a leading scholar on Public Law
280, puts it: "Tribes had not exactly thrived under the prior re-
gime of federal authority and responsibility. But when the states
took over, with their alternating antagonism and neglect of na-
tive peoples, tribes had to struggle even harder to sustain their
governing structures, economies, and cultures."'
'
Any reform of current laws governing jurisdiction over In-
dian lands must come from Congress, which has long held ple-
nary power over matters concerning Indian lands. 12 Congress'
responsibility" has been used by the federal government to promote its agenda in the
face of Indian interests at least as often as the federal government has actually pro-
moted Indian welfare. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIvE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION 345-
46 (BruceJohansen ed.) (1998).
518 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994). The crimes embraced by this statute include murder,
attempted murder, aggravated assault, rape, arson, burglary, and larceny. Id.
6 See infra notes 101-104 and accompanying text for a description of Courts of In-
dian Offenses.
7 See CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND
PUBUC LAW 280 20 (1997).
818 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994).
9 Id.
10 See infra notes 55-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects of
Public Law 280.
11See GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 7 at x.
12The phrase "plenary power"
appears to be used as a summary of the congressional powers over Indians. The power
over Indian affairs is unusual in our federal system because it includes general federal
authority to legislate over health, safety, and morals. Examples of the rare instances in
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plenary power allows federal management of nearly all Indian
concerns. 13  Congress' plenary power flows from the Indian
Commerce Clause,' 4 which the Supreme Court has interpreted
to give Congress the exclusive right to govern Indian affairs and
to deny the states any power to regulate Indian lands.1
5
Congress exercised this power in 1988 when it passed the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") in response to the
steady growth of Indian gaming (e.g., gambling) throughout the
previous decade. 16  State concerns were well represented in
IGRA, presumably because state interests are better represented
than Indian interests in Congress. Despite significant erosion
by federal courts, 17 IGRA continues to govern Indian gaming
today. Indian gaming generates around $7 billion in annual
revenues. 18 The rampant poverty on many Indian reservations
1 9
is mitigated somewhat by this cash flow.
The potential stream of revenue from IGRA is currently
cramped, however. Federal courts interpreted IGRA in such a
manner that tribes have struggled to open new gaming facili-
ties.' Lifting court-imposed restrictions on Indian gaming
growth could potentially result in greater revenues for tribes,
which in turn could facilitate tribal development.
Congress should amend IGRA to direct money generated by
Indian gaming toward tribal justice development, and amend
Public Law 280 to return criminal jurisdiction to tribes. Doing
which Congress exercises similar powers include the administration and government of
territories and possessions, the District of Columbia, and federal enclaves.
FEuX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 219 (1982 ed.).
See id. at 220.
14 U.S. CoNSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15 The Indian Commerce Clause is "the legal taproot of the plenary power as-
cribed by U.S. federal courts to Congress." Johansen, supra note 4, at 69. For a defi-
nition of plenary power, seesupra note 12.
1618 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
17 See infra notes 198-214 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' treat-
ment of IGRA.
18 See NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPAcr STUDY COMMISSION, NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACr
STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 6-2 (1999) [hereinafter "Commission Report"].
19 See infra note 158 and accompanying text for a discussion of poverty in Indian
tribes.




so would allow tribes to fund their own tribal justice systems,
rather than rely upon conditional funding, and therefore sig-
nificantly enhance tribal sovereignty. By amending Public Law
280 and IGRA, Congress could fulfill its Constitutional respon-
sibility toward Indians by creating something for and among In-
dians. Such a policy would stand in stark contrast to the sad
history of degradation and racism perpetrated upon Indians by
the United States.
21
This Comment is presented in four parts. Part I details the
Congressional motivation behind Public Law 280, the law's de-
sign, and its effects. Part II examines the structure of tribal
courts, their role in tribal sovereignty, and their relationship to
tribal cultures. Part III describes Indian gaming in general,
IGRA, and IGRA's destruction by federal courts. Finally, Part IV
discusses a plan to combat the raging crime rate on reservations
in Public Law 280 states. This plan centers around Congres-
sional amendments to both Public Law 280 and IGRA, the com-
bination of which would produce a return of criminal
jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian lands to the tribes
and provide a source of funding for tribal justice systems that is
independent of any non-tribal government.
I. PUBLIC LAw 280-ITs PURPOSES, DESIGN, AND EFFECTS
The United States Congress enacted Public Law 280 in
1953.22 The law mandated that five states (not including Alaska,
which was added later) assume jurisdiction for all criminal of-
fenses committed on Indian land in those states.23 Public Law
21 The fact that white settlers displaced Indians does not by itself create a shameful
history for the United States. Rather, as one Native American author puts it,
it's a sad history not because of the influx of settlers-after all, Indians had encroached
upon each other for thousands of years. It's a sad history because of the shabby way the
new people dealt with tribal Americans: not just the lies, but the utter unwillingness to
share an enormous land.
WILLIAM LEAST HEAT-MOON, BLUE HIGHWAYS: AJOURNEY INro AMERICA 104 (paperback
ed. 1999).
22 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994).
23 It is important to note that Public Law 280 did not grant states plenary jurisdic-
tion. For example, there were limits on state jurisdiction in the realms of "water
rights, taxation of trust property, regulatory control over trust property .. . [and]
tribal activity otherwise protected by treaty or statute, and federally protected hunt-
ing, trapping, and fishing rights." JAcK UTrER, AMERICAN INDIANS: ANSWERS TO
TODAY's QUESTIONS 155 (1993).
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280 has harmed tribes in many ways in the nearly half-century
since its passage. One of its most significant effects has been
higher crime rates for tribes in Public Law 280 states than for
tribes in non-Public Law 280 states.24
A. PURPOSES
Congress enacted Public Law 280 for three purposes-to
reduce lawlessness on Indian lands, to lower federal expendi-
tures, and to further the then-popular policy of assimilating In-
dians into the general American society.
5
Congress focused primarily on tribal crime problems when
passing Public Law 280.26 The House of Representatives origi-
nally introduced Public Law 280 as a mechanism for combating
tribal crime in California. 27 The Senate eventually expanded
the scope of the bill upon finding that "the enforcement of law
and order among the Indians in the Indian country had been
left largely to the Indian groups [and] tribes [were] not ade-
quately organized to perform that function."
28
24See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of Public Law 280's
effect on crime rates.
25See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation,
439 U.S. 463, 488 (1979) (detailing the Congressional motivations behind Public Law
280).
26 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208 (1987)
(stating that Public Law 280's chief goal was to "combat lawlessness"). It is important
to recognize that crime reduction was the primary goal for Public Law 280 because
crime has actually increased in tribes in Public Law 280 states. Thus, the statute has
failed even on its own terms.27 SeeH.R. 1063, 83d Cong. (lst Sess. 1953).
28S. REP. No. 83-699, at 5 (1953). Compare this finding with Congressional and
Presidential declarations in the past ten years that tribes are the most efficient and
best enforcers of tribal law. Such a shift in policy regarding who is best suited to fight
tribal crime suggests further that Public Law 280 should be amended. See infra note
108 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of Congress' changing
policy toward Indians. See alsoJohn Fredericks III, America's First Nations: The Origins,
History and Future of American Indian Sovereignty, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 347, 403-406 (1999)
(discussing the tension between recent Supreme Court decisions that have eroded
tribal sovereignty and Congress' recent embrace of policies favoring strong, inde-
pendent tribal governments).
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A secondary Congressional motivation in passing Public Law
280 was the reduction of federal expenditures, 29 manifested in a
refusal to provide funding to the states onto which Public Law
280 forced criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands. Congress'
concern for thrift impacted tribes in Public Law 280 states by
eliminating virtually all criminal justice funding for tribes, as the
federal government was now out of the business and the state
governments did not want to commit resources without federal
reimbursement.3 °
Congress' third motivation in passing Public Law 280 was to
further the existing federal goal of Indian assimilation. 31 This
motivation is both implicit and explicit within Public Law 280.
Looming over the law's passage were two important federal
documents relating to Indian policy. First, in 1949, a report
prepared by the Truman Administration recommended that the
"Indian problem" would be best solved by the "gradual integra-,
tion of all Indians into the general population and economy."
32
Four years later, in 1953, the House passed House Concurrent
Resolution 108, which deemed it "the policy of Congress" to
make Indians "subject to the same laws and entitled to the same
privileges and responsibilities" as all citizens. 33 This policy of as-
similation appears explicitly in the discussion surrounding Pub-
lic Law 280. One senator noted that Public Law 280 was
appropriate because Indians had "reached a state of accultura-
29See 99 CONG. REc. 9263 (1953) (Rep. Harrison indicating that the Federal gov-
ernment had spent $2 billion on tribal law enforcement since 1791 and that Congress
should allow the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("B.I.A.") to "begin going out of business in
an orderly manner.").
30See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
funding problems for Public Law 280 tribes.
31Understanding that Congress managed Indian affairs in light of a goal of assimi-
lation is important because Federal policy has shifted 180 degrees in the years since
Public Law 280, which further indicates why Public Law 280 needs Congressional at-
tention today. See infra note 133 and accompanying text for a discussion of current
Congressional policy toward Indians.
32 COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF TE EXEcUTIvE BRANCR OF THE Gov'T, INDIAN
AFFAiRs, H.R. Doc. No. 81-129, at 60 (1949). This report was part of a series of inves-
tigations designed to streamline the federal government.
33H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953).
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tion and development" allowing for a smooth transition into so-
ciety at large.34
B. DESIGN
Public Law 280's design is relatively straightforward.35 Ini-
tially, Public Law 280 transferred all criminal jurisdiction over
tribes in California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wiscon-
sin to those states.3 6 Congress added Alaska shortly thereafter.
37
These six states are collectively known as the "mandatory Public
Law 280" states, as their assumption ofjurisdiction was dictated
by Congress.
38
Public Law 280 offered every other state the option of as-
suming criminal jurisdiction over crimes on Indian lands.39 Ten
states opted to accept some sort of jurisdiction via Public Law
280.40 Eight of these ten states merely assumed limited jurisdic-
tion over particular subject matters.41 For example, Arizona ac-
cepted jurisdiction over pollution,42 Montana assumed criminal
jurisdiction over only one reservation, 43 and Iowa assumed civil
jurisdiction over only one reservation. 44 Washington assumed
34 S. Rep. No. 83-699, at 5 (1953).
5 This article addresses Public Law 280 only as it relates to criminal jurisdiction.
Public Law 280 also foisted civil jurisdiction onto certain states and this jurisdictional
delegation also had far-reaching effects. See Cohen, supra note 12, at 361-72 for a
thorough discussion of the impact of Public Law 280's civil jurisdiction transfer.
86 18 U.S.C. § 1162.
37Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a)). Con-
gress never made clear its method of selecting states for automatic inclusion in the
Public Law 280 scheme. Based on the circumstantial evidence, it appears that Con-
gress simply selected the states with the largest populations of Indians.
38 Id.
3925 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322, 1324 (1994).
4 0 See Cohen, supra note 12, at 368-70.
41 See id.
42Amz. RE'v. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-1801, 36-1865 (1974) (renumbered as § 49-561 by
Laws 1986, Ch. 368 § 39, eff.July 1, 1987 (1997)).
43 MONT. REv. CODES. ANN. §§ 83-801 to 83-806 (1966) (assuming criminal jurisdic-
tion over only the Flathead reservation) (repealed).
44 IOWA CODE ANN. §§1.12-1.14 (1995) (assuming civil jurisdiction over the Sac and
Fox Reservation).
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full jurisdiction over most judicial matters on reservations. 45
Florida is the only state that has opted to assume full Public Law
280 jurisdiction on the same level as the mandatory Public Law
280 states.
46
Congress amended Public Law 280 in 1968 to reuire tribal
consent for further state assumptions ofjurisdiction. No state
has assumed further jurisdiction over crimes committed in In-
dian country since this amendment.
The 1968 amendments also allowed states to retrocede ju-
risdiction back to tribes.48 Five states have returned jurisdiction
to certain tribes pursuant to this amendment. Minnesota,
49
Wisconsin,50 and Nebraska51 each returned complete jurisdic-
tion over crimes on one reservation to the federal government.
In addition, Washington returned jurisdiction to two tribes,5 2
and Nevada returned jurisdiction to nearly all tribes.53
In practice, this meant that tribes received jurisdiction over
minor crimes, as the federal government merely reclaimed
criminal jurisdiction over major crimes while returningjurisdic-
45WA SH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 37.12.010-37.12.070 (1991) (assuming full Public Law
280jurisdiction over non-trust land and over eight major subject areas on trust land).
46Fi.- STAT. ANN. §285.16 (1999).
4725 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994). Since this amendment, only Utah has passed legisla-
tion enabling further jurisdictional assumptions. No tribe in Utah has consented to
further state assumptions ofjurisdiction.
4825 U.S.C. § 1323 (1994).
4940 Fed. Reg. 4026 (1975) (retroceding jurisdiction to the Nett Lake Reserva-
tion).
5041 Fed. Reg. 8516 (1976) (retroceding jurisdiction to the Menominee Reserva-
tion).
51 35 Fed. Reg. 16,598 (1970) (retroceding jurisdiction to the Omaha Reserva-
tion).
52 37 Fed. Reg. 7353 (1972) (retrocedingjurisdiction to the Port Madison Reserva-
tion); 34 Fed. Reg. 14,228 (1969) (retroceding jurisdiction to the Quinalt Reserva-
tion).
53 40 Fed. Reg. 27501 (1975). This legislative retrocession concluded Nevada's
strange relationship with Public Law 280. Nevada initially opted in 1968 for full Pub-
lic Law 280jurisdiction, but allowed counties to opt out if desired. Three years later,
Nevada began to require tribal consent for assuming jurisdiction. In 1975, Nevada
then provided for retrocession except for tribes explicitly consenting to continued
state jurisdiction. Id.
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tion over minor crimes to the tribes.5 4 This essentially returned
the jurisdictional division on those tribes to the way it had been
prior to Public Law 280.
Congress has not amended Public Law 280 since 1968.
C. EFFECTS
Despite Congress' stated intention to "reduc[e] lawlessness"
on Indian lands, crime on Indian reservations has actually in-
creased during the tenure of Public Law 280.56 The federal
government recognized as much by 1975.57 In a revealing re-
port, a Department of Justice task force documented the near-
total breakdown of internal law enforcement among tribes, es-
pecially those in Public Law 280 states.5 8 The inescapable con-
clusion was that neither the states nor the tribes effectively
enforced laws (either traditional tribal laws or American consti-
tutional laws) in Indian country in the six Public Law 280
states.59 In addition, the Justice Department report calculated
that the rate of violent crime on Indian reservations in the Pub-
lic Law 280 states was 50 percent higher than in rural America
as a whole.
60
A 1999Justice Department report confirms that crime rates
within tribes in Public Law 280 states remain much higher than
within tribes in non-Public Law 280 states.61  Using statistics
54See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1994), which regulates the divi-
sion of criminal jurisdiction between tribes and the federal government.
55 S. REP. No. 83-699, at 5 (1953).
56 See DoRis MEISSNER, U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TASK FORCE ON INDIAN
MATTERS 23 (1975) (hereinafter "Meissner Report"), and LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD &
STEVEN K. SMnH, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, AMERIcAN
INDIANSAND CRIME 20 (1999) (hereinafter "1999 D.O.J. Report"). The impact of Pub-
lic Law 280 should not be dismissed because it covers only six states. Of the nearly
500 federally-recognized tribes and Native Villages, 359 are within the borders of the
six "mandatory" Public Law 280 states. UTTER, supra note 23, at 155.
5 7 See Meissner Report, supra note 56, at 23.
5 8 See id.
59 See id.
60Id. Unfortunately, there are no reliable figures for tribal crime before Public
Law 280's passage, therefore making a comparison to pre-PL 280 conditions impossi-
ble.
61 1999 D.OJ. Report, supra note 56, at 20.
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from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Re-
ports and the Bureau of the Census, the findings of the report
"reveal a disturbing picture of American Indian involvement in
crime as both victims and offenders."62 The report, while illus-
trating the generally high crime rate on Indian lands, docu-
ments the especially troubled crime rates in tribes in Public Law
280 states.
63
Clear examples of this phenomenon are the murder rates
for Indians in the states with the ten highest reservation popula-
tions.64 Of these states, five maintain criminal jurisdiction over
Indian lands via Public Law 280.65 In these five Public Law 280
states, Indian murder rates are markedly disproportionate to
the percentage of Indians in the resident population. In Min-
nesota, for example, 7.4% of all murder victims between 1976
and 1996 were Indians, while only 1.2% of the population was
Indian.66 Oregon presents similar numbers (2.7% of murder
victims, 1.4% of population),67 as does Alaska (28.0% of murder
victims, 15.5% of population). 6
The relative murder and population rates of tribes in non-
Public Law 280 states are in direct contrast to tribes in Public
Law 280 states. The same study indicates that Oklahoma Indi-
ans made up only 6.2% of murder victims, though they consti-
tuted 8.1% of the state's population.69 Studies of Arizona (4.1%
of murder victims, 5.8% of population)7" and New Mexico
(7.5% of murder victims, 8.9% of population) 71 yield similar re-
sults.
62 Id. at iii.
6 3 Id. at 20.
64 Id. at 20, tbl. 26.
65These five are California, Alaska, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington. The
first four listed are "mandatory" Public Law 280 states. Washington opted into Public
Law 280 in 1964 for nearly total criminal jurisdiction over most reservations.
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The crime problems for tribes in Public Law 280 states stem
both from a lack of funding for law enforcement and from the
breakdown of tribal justice systems. Congress drastically re-
duced funding for tribal law enforcement when it handed the
states jurisdiction for crimes committed on Indian lands but did
not appropriate any money for the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion. Prior to the enactment of Public Law 280, the federal
government, through the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("B.I.A."),
provided law enforcement for tribes.73 After Public Law 280's
passage, the B.I.A. abandoned its police role, and the states
generally refused to pick up the law-enforcement slack.74 Public
Law 280 states also declined to provide tribes with money to de-
velop their own law enforcement agencies. 75 Furthermore, Pub-
lic Law 280 states either refused to significantly supplement
their own police forces for tribal patrol and enforcement, or be-
lieved that Public Law 280 prevented state entrance into par-
ticular tribal problems.76  A particularly egregious example
occurred in California in the 1970s,77 when the Torres Martinez
tribe suffered environmental pollution due to local companies'
dumping of industrial sludge onto tribal lands. Local authori-
ties failed to respond to this criminal act, despite awareness of
the problem.78 Federal authorities, with no duty to act in this
situation, dragged their feet for so long before intervening that
significant damage was done to tribal lands.
79
72See supra notes 28-29, 71-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress'
financial motivations in passing Public Law 280 and the result this produced.
73See GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 7, at 20.
See id. at 20-22.
See id. at 11-12.
76See id. at 11-17 (explaining that Public Law 280 specifically prevented states from
exercising jurisdiction over the fate of the land held in trust for tribes by the federal
government).
77See id. at 12-20.
78See id. While this particular problem was directly caused by a state's failure to ex-
ercise authority, the problem was precipitated by Public Law 280's granting of state ju-
risdiction. Because the tribe involved stopped receiving federal funding and support
for its justice system per Public Law 280, the tribe became entirely dependent upon
state intervention, which in this case produced an enforcement vacuum.
79See GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 7, at 12-20; see also Terry L. Colvin, 5 Indian
Tribes Plan Joint Effort Against Crime, Drugs, SAN DrEGo TRIB., Feb. 20, 1988, at B-8
(quoting Rick Mazetti, tribal administrator for the Rincon Indians near Valley Center,
20001 1327
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Not only did tribes suffer a lack of law enforcement, but
tribes also abandoned their independent, traditional forms of
tribal justice. Perhaps this is explained by the states' view that
Public Law 280 granted them exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
on Indian lands.!0 For whatever reason, tribal courts in Public
Law 280 states lost the funding that previously came from the
federal government,8 1 and the state governments did not fill
that funding void.82 Ultimately, the tribal practice of traditional
law fell precipitously in Public Law 280 states.
8 3
The early 1990s brought signs that the damage wrought by
Public Law 280 would be addressed, and possibly combated.
Congress passed the Indian Tribal Justice Act ("ITJA") in
1993,84 which called for $58.4 million in annual appropriations
specifically for the development of tribal justice systems.8 5 The
act stated that "tribal justice systems are inadequately funded,
and the lack of adequate funding impairs their operation."
86
Furthermore, the Clinton Administration adopted the position
that the ap? ropriate regulators of tribal justice are the tribes
themselves.
However, the failed implementation of ITJA over the past
four years largely eclipsed the Act's promise of change for tribes
under Public Law 280.88 The money earmarked by the ITJA
never reached tribes in Public Law 280 states.8 9  The Act
California, saying his tribe was "caught between the federal government, which, by
law, can't provide police protection, and the sheriffs office, which doesn't have the
manpower for more assistance").
so SeeJohn J. Harte, Validity of a State Court's Exercise of Concurrent Jurisdiction Over
Civil Actions Arising in Indian Country: Application of the Indian Abstention Doctrine in State
Court, 21 A. INDIANL. REv. 63, 65 (1997).
81 See GOLDBERG-AMBROsE, supra note 7, at 48-56.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 55-61.
84 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3621 (1993).
Id.
86 Id.
87SeeJanet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 113,
113 (1995).
88SeeJoseph A. Myers & Elbridge Cochise, Development of Tribal Courts: Past, Present,
andFuture 79JUDICATURE 147, 148-49 (1995).
89See id.
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granted that $58.4 million to the B.I.A., not to the tribes them-
selves. 90 The B.I.A., inexplicably, never took a very large slice
out of that pie. In 1996, for example, the B.I.A. requested only
$5 million of the $58.4 million available. 91 Thus, the ITJA failed
to deliver money to the tribes for the development of tribal law
enforcement and adjudication.
Public Law 280 may have affected states as well as tribes,92
though the evidence regarding its effect on states is unclear.93
In the 1980s, states recognized that Public Law 280 was "politi-
cally ineffective, expensive, and unpopular with both Indians
and non-Indians."94  This led some states to request that the
federal government and/or the tribes reassume jurisdiction.95
States no doubt also felt the economic cost of Public Law
280. Since Public Law 280 attached no funds to the jurisdiction
forced onto states, 96 the result was obviously increased cost to
states with no offsetting increase in revenues. Thus, Congress
disregarded state fiscal concerns. 97 Some observers recognized
as much even before Congress passed Public Law 280. During
the floor debate on Public Law 280, Congressman Young as-
serted, "[s]o far as my State is concerned, it would be a large
burden on existing costs ofjudicial procedure. I think it is only
90 See id.
91 See id. at 148.
92 See VINE DELOaiA, JR. & CULOuno LYLE, AMERiCAN INDIANS, AmERiCAN JusIcE
176 (1983) (describing Public Law 280's effect on tribes as "devastating").93 This is partly because scholarship regarding Public Law 280's effect on state in-
terests has yet to develop.
94THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATVE AmEICAN LEGAL TRADITION 258 (Bruce Johansen
ed. 1998).
95 See id. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of which
states requested retrocession of criminal jurisdiction. Note that most of these states
returned jurisdiction to the federal government, not to the tribe. Note also that the
federal laws governing jurisdiction during this era only allowed states to request that
their criminal jurisdiction be returned; the tribes themselves had no power to request
return ofjurisdiction over intra-tribal crimes.
18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994) (provides for no extra funding pursuant to the assump-
tion of jurisdiction and does not alter Indians tax-exempt status regarding income
taxes).
97 See Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reserva-
tion Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535, 551 (1975) (setting the framework for the juris-
dictional clashes regarding Public Law 280 that have occurred in the last 25 years).
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right that the Federal Government should make some contribu-
tion for that., 98 Not only did Public Law 280 impact states' bot-
tom line directly, states also suffered when crime rose on Indian
lands. Increases in crime such as those resulting from Public
Law 280 create significant social, transactional, and economic
costs.
99
II. TRIBAL COURTS-HOW THEYWORKAND THEIR RELATION TO
CRIME AND SOVEREIGNTY.
Public Law 280's deleterious effects on tribes are largely tied
to the law's impact on tribal courts. Public Law 280 either en-
tirely decimated or significantly eroded the justice systems in
place within most tribes in Public Law 280 states.100 To deter-
mine the source and effects of this breakdown, it is necessary to
examine what kind of courts exist in tribes, how they function,
their value to tribes, and their effect on tribal crime rates.
A. STRUCTURE OF TRIBAL COURTS
While the diversity of Indian tribes makes neat categoriza-
tion of tribal justice systems impossible, 10 1 some generalizations
can be made from historical and anecdotal evidence.
Many of the modern tribal courts originated in the Courts
of Indian Offenses. 10 2 The federal government imposed these
98Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 383 (1976) (recounting the debate regard-
ing Public Law 280 within the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Commit-
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953)).
99See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of Public Law 280's
effect on crime rates.
100 See BRADFORD W. MORSE, INDIAN TRIBAL CouRTs IN THE UNITED STATES: A MODEL
FOR CANADA? 12 (1980) (noting that "the effect of Public Law 280... was to emascu-
late the tribal courts in those particular states to such an extent that most have disap-
peared").
101 See Carey N. Vicenti, The Reemergence of Tribal Society and TraditionalJustice Systems,
79 JuDicAruRE 134, 137 (1995) ("there are more than 535 potentially identifiable dis-
creet systems of [tribal] adjudication, each of which must account for cultures in
their midst that are in volatile transition").
102 Courts of Indian Offenses were created by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1883
to enforce the Major Crimes Act. The B.I. used these courts to "fill the void caused
by declines in traditional authority and to reduce the remaining power of traditional
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courts on Indians during the late 19th century. 03 The Courts of
Indian Offenses were, as one commentator notes, "tools of co-
lonialism imposed . . . to keep order on Indian reservations
while educating tribal people in the dominant culture's
norms."'0 4 The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 abolished
the Courts of Indian Offenses and encouraged tribes to adopt
their own versions of the Anglo-American justice system. 10 5 The
development of Anglo-American-style tribal justice systems ac-
celerated with the 1975 passage of the Indian Self Determina-
tion and Education Assistance Act, which provided Indians with
more discretion in the administration of federal programs. 0
6
While the workings of tribal courts vary widely, they share
certain procedural and jurisdictional notions. Thanks to the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,107 modem tribal courts observe
the same due process rights that state and federal courts ob-
serve, even where due process rights are at odds with tribal cus-
toms. 0 8 The criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts in non-Public
Law 280 states is exclusive 0 9 over crimes not covered by the Ma-
jor Crimes Act and concurrent with federal courts over crimes
covered by the Major Crimes Act if the offender is an Indian.
Tribal courts have no jurisdiction over crimes covered by the
Major Crimes Act if the offender is a non-Indian." 0 In Public
Law 280 states, tribal courts' jurisdiction varies, depending on
how vigorously the state enforces its exclusive criminal jurisdic-
tion.II
chiefs .... Congress never expressly authorized these courts." Cohen, supra note 12,
at 333.
103 SeeJohansen, supra note 4, at 70.
104 See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian
Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 285, 291 (1998).
105 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994).
106 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994). This act had no impact on justice systems in Public Law
280 states, however, as no federal money flowed to tribal justice systems in Public Law
280 states.
107 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994).
108 SeeJohansen, supra note 4, at 138.
109 The civiljurisdiction of tribes is a matter of enough complexity in its own right
to warrant a separate examination.
110 See GILBERT L. HALL, AN INTRODUCION TO CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN




Today, many tribal courts employ a combination of Anglo-
American and traditional tribal justice notions.1 1 2  However,
tribal courts vary in the extent to which traditional notions of
community and punishment play a role in courts. 1 3 The tribal
courts that combine American and traditional notions typically
are two-tiered. 1 4 That is, most systems have both trial and ap-
pellate courts. Interestingly, the appellate courts often cover
multiple tribes. 1 5 These developed tribal justice systems mirror,
to a limited extent, those found on the state and federal levels,
embracing forms of the adversarial system of litigation.
116
Modem tribal courts have also followed the Anglo-
American model of specialization. 117 Thus, in the 1990s, many
tribes developed courts that deal exclusively with gaming, small
claims, and administrative issues.
118
While this type of system is generally favored by outside ob-
servers, tribal courts built on Anglo-American principles often
struggle for legitimacy among tribal members. 9 Part of the
reason that tribal courts face an uphill battle in gaining tribal
acceptance is that these courts must withstand the scrutiny of
federal and state governments. 120  Federal and state govern-
ments possess the power to erode tribal court authority and will-
ingly exercise that power.121 Consequently, in order to retain
112SeeVicenti, supra note 101, at 140 (classifying developing tribal courts into five
categories, with "the hybrid American-traditional model far outnumber[ing]" the
others).
113 See ROBERT D. COOTER & WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER, IS THERE INDIAN COMMON
LAW? THE ROLE OF CUSTOM IN AMERICAN TRIBAL COURTS 20-33 (1994).
114 See Newton, supra note 104, at 294.
115 See id.
116 See i,
117 See generally id.
118See id at 294.
119 See id.
120 See Newton, supra note 104, at 294. See also Frank Pommersheim, "Our Federal-
ism" in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal Courts'
Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 123, 130-44 (2000).
121 See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978) (deny-
ing tribes the right to prosecute non-Indians); State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 934
(Utah 1992) (holding that the Uintah Indian Reservation was smaller than the Indian
defendant claimed).
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authority, tribal courts must adopt certain characteristics that
satisfy requirements imposed by external governments.
122
This is not to suggest that tribal justice systems routinely fail
to account for tribal norms and customs, however. For exam-
ple, the Apache tribe embraces its history of creating sentencing
strategies that aim to develop the offender's contrition and re-
morse. 123 Apache legal disputes, therefore, often focus on creat-
ing a remedy that promotes reintegration of the offender into
society, as well as restoring the reputation of the victim. 124
Another example of how modem tribal courts embrace
tribal custom is found on the Navajo reservation. A pair of legal
anthropologists125 studying the Navajo court system in the 1980s
found that "the enforcement of social norms pervades tribal
courts. [The Navajo Chief Judge] uses Navajo common law
daily to decide cases." 126  In fact, the Navajo code provides
courts with criteria for situations where custom is determina-
tive 127 and states that "[w]here any doubts arise as to the cus-
toms and usages of the Navajo Nation the court may request the
advice of counselors familiar with these customs and usages." 128
122 See COOTER & FlEENTSCHER, supra note 113, at 23-28 (discussing how tribal court
justices feel pressure to take no part in the executive administration of the tribe, de-
spite the custom thatjudges also help make and enforce rules in certain tribes, in or-
der to appear independent and thereby receive funding).
123 SeeVicenti, supra note 101, at 138.
124 See id.
125 Note the joke that the typical Navajo family consists of a husband, wife, chil-
dren, grandparents, an uncle or two, and an anthropologist. The joke may be funny,
but some Indian intellectuals bristle at the thought of so much poking and prodding
of Indian culture.
126 See COOTER & FMNTSCHER, supra note 113, at 8.
127 See id. at 29 (quoting the Navajo code as stating that "[i]n all cases the Courts
of the Navajo Nation shall apply any laws of the United States that may be applicable




B. INDIAN JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND SOVEREIGNTY
In the early years of the United States federal courts recog-
nized Indian tribes as sovereign nations. 12  The courts said this
sovereignty was subject to restriction by Congress, however.130
Therefore, the baseline assumption, as developed by federal
common law, is that tribes are sovereign and that sovereignty is
only restricted by explicit acts of Congress. A leading authority
on federal Indian law even goes so far as to argue that tribal
sovereignty was not created by the federal government, but ex-
isted before and independent of the United States.
131
Whatever the source of tribal sovereignty, well-developed
Indian justice systems create stronger tribal sovereigns. Presi-
dent Clinton and his Administration's Department ofJustice be-
lieve that Indian justice systems should balance Anglo-American
ideals with traditional tribal problem-solving methods, as sover-
eignty is strengthened most if tribal courts can both articulate
tribal customs and earn the respect of federal and state gov-
ernments. 132
Sovereignty is directly related to legal processes. At least
one governmental scholar argues that "sovereignty, or acting
like a government, centers around questions ofjurisdiction and
the ability to tax and zone."133 Congress' recent positions on
Indian affairs illustrate this point. Since the mid-1970s, Con-
gress has promulgated a policy of self-determination for Indians
that ultimately seeks stronger Indian sovereigns. 134 At the same
129See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832).
15010Id.
131 COHEN, supra note 12, at 229.
132 SeeJanet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 113,
114 (1995) (stating that tribal courts "can act to preserve tribal culture and customs.
Tribal values are affirmed not only in decisions about such issues as children, contract
disputes, and sentencing, but also in the process by which the decisions are made, the
way disputes are resolved, and the manner in which justice is done"). Of course,
tribes desire stronger tribal sovereignty as well. See Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Jus-
tice Systems and Tribal Society, 79JuDICATURE 126, 133 (1995).
133 LINDA MEDCALF, LAWAND IDEN-rri 61 (1978).
134 For example, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1994), which outlined the removal of federal
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time, Congress passed the Indian Tribal Justice Act in 1993,
which stated that tribal courts are "the appropriate forums for
the adjudication of disputes affecting personal and property
rights" and they are "essential to the maintenance of the culture
and identity of Indian tribes."135 Tribal culture and identity are
often at odds with the norms enforced by Anglo-American legal
systems.1 36  One Indian law scholar notes the differences be-
tween customs embraced by tribal law and norms enforced by
American law: tribal law focuses on "communal rights" while
American law focuses on individual rights; tribal law emphasizes
trusting relationships rather than adversarial relationships; and
apology and forgiveness are paramount in tribal law, whereas
American law stresses "vindication to society."
137
For Indians, therefore, sovereignty means the ability to op-
erate ajustice system that takes into account the goals and tradi-
tions of tribal societies, without direct regard for Anglo-
American ideals. These goals include maintaining a complete
society. 138 Indian justice systems are often guided by a "holistic
philosophy"139 that involves a complex series of relationships
from the very beginning of a legal dispute. 140  It is the unim-
peded expression of these norms, made possible with a strong
justice system, that indicates and develops sovereignty.
domination of programs for Indians. Congress also passed the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994), which limited the power of state courts to
hear Indian child custody cases. Also, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regula-
tion Act in 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 1166, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994), which stated that
"a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development,
tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government." 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
1 5 Indian TribalJustice Support Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3601(5), (7) (1993).
136 See Melton, supra note 132, at 126 (noting that tribal justice systems generally
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C. SOVEREIGNTY AND CRIME
Stronger tribal sovereigns maintain lower crime rates when
sovereignty includes the ability to enforce tribal norms through
justice mechanisms.1 41
An anthropological study of tribal courts in the early
1970s142 illustrates the connection between sovereignty and
crime.1 43  This study considered the tribal justice systems of
three reservations: the Standing Rock tribe (small in popula-
tion and resources, located in North Dakota);144 the Blackfeet
tribe (also small in population and resources, located in Mon-
tana); 45 and the Navajo reservation (large in population and
resources, located primarily in northeast Arizona).146 The two
smaller tribes reported crime rates much higher than in the Na-
vajo reservation. 47 The study depicts the Standing Rock tribe as
employing very little "white man's law." That is, the Standing
141 It is also noted that those tribes with the most developed court systems-the
ones that embrace both tribal customs and American procedures-are exclusively in
non-Public Law 280 states. The question remains, however. What has caused the
drop in crime rates in these states? Is the drop a result of greater sovereignty or
merely not being subject to state criminal jurisdiction? The answer is impossibly un-
clear, because sovereignty and jurisdiction are so intricately related.
142This study actually is one of the most recent studies of crime on specific Indian
tribes. Scholarship and empirical studies in this area are desperately needed if a true
understanding of tribal crime is ever to be arrived at.
143See SAMuELJ. BRAKEL, AMERIcAN INDIAN TRIBAL COURTS (1978). This study pro-
vides one of the only trustworthy sources of crime statistics for Indian lands. How-
ever, the author's view of tribal courts is clearly one of disdain ("All steps taken to
preserve the tribal courts or the reservation system can only be rearguard actions.
The reservations, with their courts and other institutions, are destined to disappear in
time .... The time appears to be ripe to expose the temporary, psychological pur-
poses of these institutions and to inform the Indians of more permanent, functional
alternatives." Id. at 101-102.). This view renders the conclusions in the study less
valuable than the hard evidence presented.
144Id. at 56-57.
145 Id- at 67-69.
46 Id. at 79-81.
147 See id. at 28-33. In the Standing Rock reservation in 1972, 1,626 offenses were
charged in a population of 4,460, yielding a rate of 36 percent of the population.
The rate on the Blackfeet reservation for 1973 was 55 percent (3,319 offenses, popu-
lation just over 6,000). The rate on the Navajo reservation for 1974 was 26 percent
(about 26,000 offenses in a population around 100,000).
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Rock courts administer justice very informally and exclusively
through Indians trained in neither Anglo-American nor Indian
law.141 The Blackfeet courts, by contrast, closely mirrored An-
glo-American justice systems. 149 However, theirjudges were not
trained and theirjustice system was not well-funded. 50
So, even though the Blackfeet and Standing Rock tribes
employed opposite apProaches to tribal justice, both suffered
from high crime rates. The Navajo reservation, on the other
hand, had a much lower crime rate than either of the other
tribes.1 52 The Navajo courts are characterized in the study as
run by people trained in both American and tribal law.153 The
decisions handed down by these courts embrace much of
American legal procedure but maintain a unique application of
Indian norms. 1 4  This is the hallmark of the well-developed
tribal justice system, and it represents an example of what a
tribal court can be when provided with adequate funding.1
5 5
Ill. INDIAN GAMING
Indian reservations have struggled economically since cre-
ated by the federal government in the mid-19th century. In the
early 1990s, thirty-nine percent of Indians were jobless and forty
percent lived below the poverty line.15 6  The last twenty-five
years have seen Indian reservations make an economic impact
148 See id. at 56-67.
149 See BRAxEL, supra note 143, at 67-68 (noting that the Blackfeet court "has the
reputation of being a 'good' court among white 'Indian experts,' who are apologetic
about the shape of the Standing Rock tribal court specifically, but sold on the tribal
court concept." Id. at 69 (emphasis in original)).
150 See id. at 78.
151 See id. at 56-67.
52 &
153 See BRAXEL, supra note 143, at 81-82 (noting the facilities and decorum of Na-
vajo courts).
154 See id. at 80-87 (describing resolutions focused on reparation and reintroduc-
tion into society).
155See generally Reno, supra note 132 (suggesting that the ideal tribal court should
embrace American procedures and certain individual rights while applying uniquely
tribal norms and customs).
156138 CONG. REC. S3425-S3426 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1992).
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in one area, however: gambling.157 Gaming brought economic
opportunities to tribes on a scale never before seen in Indian
country.158  As might be expected, though, as the amount of
money flowing onto tribal lands via gaming increased, so too
did governmental interest in Indian gaming. This interplay of
Indian, state, and federal interests regarding Indian gaming
profoundly affects tribes today. Ultimately, Indian gaming
revenues stand as a potential balm for the ills of tribal justice
systems in Public Law 280 states.'5 9
The recent history of Indian gaming can be divided into
three stages-(1) before and shortly after Califbrnia v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians;,160 (2) the first ten years of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act;161 and (3) the current state of Indian
gaming, which is dictated largely by Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida.
A. CABAZONAND THE CREATION OF MODERN INDIAN
GAMING
Contemporary Indian gaming started in 1979 when the
Seminole Tribe of Florida opened a modem bingo hall 163 in
contravention of existing Florida law.164 A county sheriff stated
that he would enforce the Florida statute prohibiting non-
157 Commission Report, supra note 18, at 6-2.
158 See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Pursuing Tribal Economic Development at The
Bingo Palace, 29 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 97 (1997).
159 Indian gaming obviously also looms as vitally important for tribes in non-Public
Law 280 states. After all, a recent Congressional study concluded that "major federal
expenditures on behalf of Native Americans have declined during the period FY 1975
through FY 1999 (in constant dollars)." Commission Report, supra note 18, at 6-6.
However, the blight of crime on reservations in non-Public Law 280 states-while it is
significant-is not the concern of this paper.
160 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
16118 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1988), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
162 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995).
163 SeeSeminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 311 (5th Cir. 1981).
164 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.093(2), (3) (West 1979) (repealed 1991).
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charitable bingo; 165 the tribe went to federal court to obtain an
injunction.1 66
In resolving this case, the Fifth Circuit introduced a concept
that is still central to Indian gaming laws today. The court asked
"whether the state statute in question represents an exercise of
the state's regulatory or prohibiting authority."'167 In framing
the question this way, the Fifth Circuit embraced established
Supreme Court doctrine allowing state interference with tribes
when aming is generally prohibited rather than merely regu-
lated.' Put simply, if Florida picked and chose when and
where bingo could take place, then the state could not regulate
Indian bingo.169 On the other hand, if the state outlawed bingo
across the board, then it could enforce the prohibition against
the tribe. 170  In this case, the Fifth Circuit held that Florida's
bingo statute was regulatory because it allowed charitable and
civic bingo.
171
Other federal courts followed the Fifth Circuit's lead on this
issue and analyzed attempted state interference with Indian
bingo under the regulation/prohibition dichotomy.172 Because
most states exempted charities from their anti-bingo statutes,
these bingo laws were deemed regulation rather than prohibi-
tion. 73 More tribes opened bingo halls. Gross revenues from
165 See Seminole Tribe offlorida, 658 F.2d at 311.
See id.
167 See id. at 313.
168 See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). At least one scholar has criti-
cized Bryan's criminal/regulatory distinction because "under [Bryan's] rationale,
tribal sovereignty is a separate question from whether the general intent of a statute is
criminal or regulatory." Arthur F. Foerster, Divisiveness and Delusion: Public Law 280
and the Evasive Criminal/RegulatoryDistinction, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1361 (1999).
169See Seminole Tribe of lorida, 658 F.2d at 313.
170 See id.
171 See id. at 315.
172 Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712, 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981)
(tribe in Wisconsin won the right to open a bingo hall). See also Barona Group of
Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185, 1185 (9th Cir.
1982) (tribe in California won the right to open bingo hall without state interfer-
ence).
173See Oneida Tribe of Indians, 518 F. Supp. at 712; Barona Group of Capitan Grande
Band of Mission Indians, 694 F.2d at 1185.
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more than 100 Indian gaing facilities across the country
topped $100 million by 1986. 17
As the victories in federal court for tribal gaming accumu-
lated, the governors and law enforcement officials in states in
which Indian gambling blossomed came to resent the growing
revenue streams.175 The states took their grievances to the Su-
preme Court in 1987 in California v. Cabazon.176
Though it was the leading Supreme Court opinion on In-
dian gaming at the time it was made, the Cabazon opinion was
surprisingly simple and enjoyed only a short life as the law of
the land. The Court employed the same rationale as had lower
courts in the previous five years, resting its analysis on the regu-
lation/prohibition distinction.177 In this case, the Court af-
firmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that California merely
regulated, and did not prohibit, "gambling in general and
bingo in particular."178 California, therefore, could not enforce
its local ordinances against the tribe for holding bingo and card
games on Indian land. 
79
Cabazon capped a decade of significant victories in federal
court for Indians hoping to catch the gaming gravy train. Con-
gress took control of that train, however, in the year following
Cabazon when it passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) 18 IGRA comprehensively regulated the creation and
operation of Indian gaming facilities. The general federal regu-
lation of Indian gaming did not necessarily pose any problems
for gaming tribes. However, the particular provision of IGRA
174 S. REP. No. 99-493, at 2 (1986).
175States have a long history of attempting to remove wealth from Indian lands.
The historian Howard Zinn illustrates this pattern during colonial times. See ZINN, su-
pra note 1, at 78-94. Professor Zinn notes instances of colonists massacring Indians
north of Boston merely for a piece of land slightly more valuable then their own. Id.
at 87. This pattern is also evidenced by Georgia's acts that precipitated the Worcester
decision. Georgia's entire motivation in dominating Indian land was that gold had
recently been discovered on land that was previously thought worthless. See Ronald
A. Berutti, The Cherokee Cases: The Fight to Save the Supreme Court and the Cherokee Indi-
ans, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291,296 (1992).
176 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
177 See id. at 211.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 121.
180 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1988); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
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that required tribes to work with states in order to open a gam-
ing facility did create large-scale impediments for gaming-
desirous tribes.
B. IGRA
IGRA created three classes of Indian gamin and a federal
body to regulate the operation of these classes.' 8 Class I games
consist of traditional tribal games of chance, often those used in
tribal ceremonies and celebrations. 8 2 Tribes maintain exclusive
control over this class of activities.
Glass II games are bingo and card games that state laws al-
low at least some entities to operate. 183 Class II does not include
blackjack or baccarat. A tribe can operate Class II games free
from state and federal supervision, so long as neither state nor
federal law prohibits the operation of the game.184 IGRA also
requires the tribe to enact a local ordinance governing the Class
II gaming enterprise.185 The Chairman of the National Indian
Gaming Commission must approve this ordinance.
186
Finally, Indians retain much less control in deciding when
and where to operate Class III games. All games not explicitly
covered by either Class I or Class II are Class III games. 8 7 These
include blackjack, slot machines, roulette and other highly so-
phisticated games.1 8 8  Creating a Class III gaming facility re-
quires two main steps: a tribe must first satisfy all of the
demands for opening a Class II operation, 189 then negotiate an
181Id. at §§ 2701-2721.
182 Id. at § 2703(6).
18 1d. at § 2703(7).
14 Id. at § 2710(b) (1) (A).
15Id. at § 2710(b) (1) (B).
18 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (b) (1) (B) (1994). The National Indian Gaming Commission
is made up of three members, with the President selecting the Chairman and the Sec-
retary of the Interior picking the other two members. Id. at § 2704(b) (1). The
Chairman alone approves tribal ordinances creating Class II or Class III gaming facili-
ties; the whole Commission has the power to levy civil fines, issue subpoenas, monitor
gaming operations, and issue reports. Id. at §§ 2705-2706.
187 Id. at § 2703(8).
188 id 
.189 See id. at § 2710 (7) (B).
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agreement with the state in which the gaming operation re-
sides.19
0
C. IGRA ERODED BY COURTS
IGRA's requirements for establishing a Class III gaming fa-
cility caused great complications for tribes desiring to open
gaming halls. 1  States and tribes-never good friends, espe-
cially in a contest for valuable resources 92--fought in federal
court over the bilateral agreements required by IGRA before a
tribe can operate a Class III gaming facility.
193
When tribes sued states in federal court, alleging that states
refused to negotiate in good faith, as required by IGRA, states
defended on grounds of sovereign immunity.194 The Eighth,
95
Ninth,' Tenth,' and Eleventh Circuits addressed the issue
of whether states were subject to suit in federal court under
IGRA. Of these decisions, only the Eleventh Circuit upheld a
state's claim of immunity from suit under IGRA.199
19 Id. at § 2710(d) (1) (C).
191 See infra notes 196-211 and accompanying text.
192 See supra note 177 for discussion of history of states' attempts to secure wealth
from Indian lands.
193 See, e.g., infra notes 196-203.
194 Id.
195Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 280-81 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that Congress abrogated the states' traditional Eleventh Amendment im-
munity with the passage of IGRA. This holding extended to the Indian Commerce
Clause the idea that Commerce Clause gives Congress power to abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
196Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 1994) (fol-
lowing Cheyenne River and holding that tribes can take states to court under IGRA to
force states to negotiate in good faith).
197 Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding states' Eleventh Amendment immunity abrogated by IGRA and states are
therefore subject to suit).
198 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1026-29 (11th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the Indian Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Thus, the Seminole tribe could not
sue Florida).
199See id. at 1026-29.
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Despite the Circuit Courts' generally Indian-friendly inter-
pretations of IGRA, the Supreme Court decimated IGRA in
1996 when it decided Seminole Indian Tribe ofFlorida v. F/orida,2 °°
the appeal of the lone Circuit Court decision holding states
immune from suit under IGRA.J°
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in
Seminole for a sharply divided court.20 2 The opinion for the 5-4
majority first paid lip service to the importance of tribes and
Congress' authority to regulate Indian affairs. 20 3 The Court re-
counted a pair of fundamental notions of tribal sovereignty: (1)
that tribes enjoyed political status prior to the existence of the
United States; and (2) that tribes are distinct from states and
the United States. 20 4 Rehnquist's opinion also recognized that
the Indian Commerce Clause "accomplishes a greater transfer
of power from the States to the Federal Government than does
the Interstate Commerce Clause."
20 5
Ultimately, however, the Seminole Court concluded that
tribal sovereignty must defer to states' rights. 206 So limited was
Congress' power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, the
Court concluded, that "[e]ven when the Constitution vests in
Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area,
the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization
of suits by private parties against unconsenting States."20 7 With
these words, the Court effectively denied Indians their only op-
portunity to enforce IGRA. Since then, Indians have not been
able to confront states unwilling to negotiate the licensing of
200517 U.S. 44 (1996) (SouterJ., dissenting).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 47.
2 0 3 See id at 48-51, 54.
204Id.
205 Id. at 62.
206 See Seminole Indian Tribe 517 U.S. at 63-76.
207Id. at 72.
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Class III gaming facilities.20 8 Congressional regulation of Indian
gaming is, therefore, currently in a state of flux.
20 9
D. SCOPE OF INDIAN GAMING AND ITS EFFECT ON
TRIBES
Although Seminole Tribe effectively destroyed IGRA, Indian
gaming has continued to grow since the decision. In the
roughly ten years between the passage of IGRA and the Seminole
Tribe decision, annual tribal gaming revenues grew from $212
million to $6.7 billion.2 10 The growth of tribal gaming outpaced
overall gaming growth in the same period.2 n
These vast sums are not shared equally by all Indians, how-
ever. The 20 largest Indian gaming facilities account for about
half of all Indian gang revenues;212 the next 85 largest ac-
count for only 41.2%.213 Moreover, even though 146 tribes have
Class III gaming operations, two-thirds of the 554 federally rec-
ognized tribes have no gaming at all.214 Nevertheless, empirical
evidence suggests that gaming has brought certain tribes eco-
nomic benefits.215
208 See Commission Report, supra note 18, at 6-10 (noting that the continuing effect
of Seminole Tribe has frustrated efforts by some tribes to open Class III gaming facili-
ties). This report was prepared pursuant to a Congressional resolution calling for a
multi-year examination of gambling in the United States.
209 See it. at 6-24, recommendation 6.13 (calling for Congressional reconsideration
of the mechanism for creating a Class IlI gaming facility).
210 Id. at 6-1-6-2. Note that these numbers are in terms of absolute 1997 dollars.
Thus, this thirty-fold increase does not include inflation.
211 Id. at 6-2. "For example, from 1996 to 1997, tribal gambling revenues increased
by 16.5 percent, whereas commercial gambling revenues increased by 4.8 percent."
Id.
212 Id.
213 See Commission Report, supra note 18, at 6-2.
Id.
215Id. at 6-16. The Report notes the reduction in unemployment among several
tribes with gaming. For example, the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe-located in central
Minnesota-reports a drop in the jobless rate from 60 percent to almost zero be-
tween 1991 and 1999. The tribe opened two Class HII casinos in 1992, one of which
now has a hotel, and is contemplating the building of a golf resort. This casino regu-
larly attracts top entertainers, such as country and western musician Kenny Rogers.
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Moreover, tribes have applied gaming profits to the devel-
opment of critical social and municipal services.216 Success on
reservations with gaming is not only economic; the federal
commission studying the subject found that "pride, optimism,
hope, and opportunity have accompanied the revenues and
programs generated by Indian gambling facilities."217  Some
reservations have decided via referenda not to engage in gain-
ing,21s concerned that operating gaminn facilities would un-
dermine the cultural integrity of tribes.2  It is worth noting,
though, that a recent Congressional study concluded that "the
revenues from Indian gambling have had a significant-and
generally positive-impact on a number of reservations."220
IV. PROPOSAL
Public Law 280 has failed to provide Indian reservations
with adequate justice systems. Many commentators believe
this.22 ' Still, crafting a workable solution to the problem of in-
adequate justice systems depends upon a focused understand-
ing of why Public Law 280 has failed. Thus, any solution must
incorporate the fact that localized law enforcement and adjudi-
cation is best at fighting crime on Indian reservations, 222 and the
fact that meaningful tribal sovereignty depends upon having a
216See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 158, at 107 (noting the building of an ultra-
modem fire department by the Sycuan tribe in California). Another example is the
sparkling museum of Indian history and culture built by the Mille Lacs Band of
Ojibwe.
217 Commission Report, supra note 18, at 6-16.
218 Id. at 6-2. (The most significant example of this is the Navajo Nation, the na-
tion's largest reservation, which rejected a proposal to negotiate the opening of a ca-
sino).
219 Commission Report, supra note 18, at 6-3.
220 Id. at 6-14.
221 See VanessaJ. Jimenez and Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction
Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U.L. REV. 1627, 1632 (1998) (arguing that Public Law
280 is "one of the most controversial and detrimental federal statutes affecting Indian
tribes"). See also GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 7, at ix (arguing that "Public Law 280
brought hardship to the affected reservations in the form of state jurisdiction and a
withdrawal of federal services").
222 See supra notes 54-70, 141-155 and accompanying text for a discussion of the re-
lationship between self-government and crime (detailing higher crime rates on tribes
in Public Law 280 states).
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justice system that is truly independent and has adequate re-
sources.
Any solution must also take into account the scope and basis
of the relationships between tribes and federal and state gov-
ernments. Tribes are wards of the federal government; thus,
the federal government owes tribes a duty.224 Furthermore, the
federal government has long recognized tribes as distinct gov-
ernmental entities separate from state or federal govern-
ments.225 Moreover, there is no inherent relationship between
tribes and states; 226 such a relationship exists only to the extent
that those two entities develop one or the federal government
creates one. Congress is therefore charged with a duty to legis-
late for the benefit of the tribes and without concern for tribal-
state relationships. Here, the interests of the tribes demand
that Congress amend Public Law 280 and the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act. Both must be amended since the former
caused increases in crime within tribes and the latter has been
rendered unenforceable by the courts.
Public Law 280 should be amended to return criminal ju-
risdiction to tribal courts. States need not have any criminal ju-
risdiction over crimes committed on Indian lands. In fact, state
participation in this area historically has been bad for both
227tribes and states.2 2 The federal government's duty to Indians
223 See supra notes 141-155 and accompanying text for a discussion of this proposi-
tion.
224See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal trust re-
sponsibility and that doctrine's ramifications.
225 See id. The idea of tribes as entities dependent to the federal government
should not be equated as placing the tribes into the American version of federalism.
As dependent nations, tribes are not in a triangular relationship with the federal gov-
ernment; rather, tribes have a direct relationship with the federal government based
on the idea that tribes are their own political entities. Tribes have no relationship
with states.
226 See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-223 (1959). Williams held that the basic
principle announced in Worcester survives today-"absent governing Acts of Con-
gress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Id. at 220.
227 See supra notes 54-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of effects of Public
Law 280 on tribes. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Public Law 280's effect on states.
1346 [Vol. 90
PUBLC LAW 280 AND NDIAN GAMING
demands that Congress restore the tribal justice and law en-
forcement systems.
2
However, such restoration would require adequate funding.
Proposals have ranged from increasing federal funding for
these purposes to simply mandating the B.I.A. distribute the
money available per the Indian Tribal Justice Act.229 Rather
than give criminal jurisdiction to states without any correspond-
ing funding (as under Public Law 280), Congress should guar-
antee the funding of tribal courts, as these courts-along with
stronger tribal sovereignty-are best for tribes.
One possible (though still problematic) method of funding
tribal courts is to revise IGRA. The IGRA was crippled by the
states' regulatory role;230 an amended IGRA should not provide
a state role in Indian gaming. Congress was never compelled to
involve states in the Indian gaming decision-making process,231
states have no authority over tribes and minimal interest in In-
dian gaming, and courts have rejected the argument that states
can regulate Indian gaming under the guise of confronting or-
ganized crime.232 Moreover, state claims to an overriding inter-
est in preventing its citizens from gambling are largely
unfounded. The states that operate lotteries, after all, reap far
more money from state lotteries than tribes generate from In-
dian gaming.233 If a state challenged this proposed rendition of
IGRA as lacking in concern for state interests, Williams v. Lee
would control.2 4 Under Williams, absent a Congressional man-
date or some agreement between the state and a tribe, a state
228Many commentators have called for this. See, e.g., Foerster, supra note 168, at
1367 ("Congress should restore to tribes and the federal government sole criminal
jurisdiction"); see alsoJimenez and Song, supra note 222, at 1706 ("Indian tribes must
have within their means the appropriate tools and support to mete outjustice in their
inherently community-based endeavors").
229SeeJimenez & Song, supra note 221, at 1697-1700; see also Foerster, supra note
168, at 1368-69.
230 See supra notes 194-209 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal
courts' treatment of IGRA.
231 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57 (1996).
232 See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-222 (1987).
233 Commission Report, supra note 18, at 6-2.
2S4 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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has no concern with tribal activity.235 Thus, the challenge would
be unsuccessful.
Congress clearly has the power to dictate broad restrictions
in an amended IGRA. Their power over tribes is plenary,236 and
gaming falls within the Indian Commerce Clause. 2 3 7 It is this
power that alloWs Congress to dictate the flow of Indian gaming
revenues in the current statute. Section 2710 of the IGRA, for
example, stipulates that net revenues from Indian gaming be
distributed for limited purposes. 238 The statute states that "net
revenues from any tribal gaming are not to be used for purposes
other than" funding "tribal government operations," providing
for the "general welfare" of tribal members, promoting "tribal
economic development," donating to charity, or helping to
fund local non-Indian governmental operations.239 Since the
economic benefits of Indian gaming may be directed toward so-
cially beneficial goals, herein lies the answer to the problem of
funding tribal courts.
Congress should amend IGRA to enhance section 2710 by
dictating that a fixed percentage of gaming profits go toward
the development of tribal justice systems.2 4 0 The current IGRA
does not identify specific targets for Indian gaming revenue;
rather, it creates five broad categories of permissible beneficiar-
ies. Congress can-and should-earmark a portion of Indian
Id. at 219-22.
236See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 147-149 (SouterJ., dissenting).
237 Id.
238 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994).
29 Id.
240 The new IGRA should further enhance the efficacy of Indian self-
determination by not allowing states to interfere with Indian gaming based on the
regulatory/prohibitory distinction. Thus, the new IGRA should explicitly state that
whether a state outlaws all forms of gambling is not determinative of whether a tribe
can operate a gaming operation. Such a move would abrogate the traditional state
argument that if a state's citizens can't do something anywhere else in the state, then
tribes shouldn't be allowed to either. By allowing tribes to choose to operate gaming
facilities, notwithstanding state law, Congress would reaffirm the fact that states and
tribes do not have any relationship, although reservations happen to exist within a
particular state.
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gaming revenue specifically for the development of tribal justice
systems.2
41
Calling for an amended IGRA that would still not allow
complete Indian autonomy is a recognition of political reality.
Congress is unlikely to relinquish all control over Indian gam-
ing; Congress has never in the past given tribes authority over a
policy area that Congress at one time controlled. If an
amended section 2710 of IGRA allowed Congressional control
over the programs receiving gaming profits, then such an
amendment would be more palatable to Congress. While such
an arrangement is arguably less satisfying than complete Indian
autonomy, it is a more realistic starting point for a productive
discussion of what to do about crime on reservations in Public
Law 280 states and IGRA.
The benefits of such a program would be twofold. First,
and most obvious, such a move would provide a sorely needed
revenue source for tribal justice development. Congress' find-
ings regarding the Indian Tribal Justice Act acknowledge the
problem: tribal justice systems are integral aspects of tribal gov-
ernment,2 4 2 these systems "are inadequately funded," and "the
lack of adequate funding impairs their obligation."243 Further-
more, Congress found that "tribal government involvement in
and commitment to improving tribal justice systems is essential
to the accomplishment of the goals" of the statute.
244
This proposal would increase tribal independence. Allow-
ing tribes freedom from state regulation in opening gaming
halls would promote autonomy and economic development. In
addition, the corresponding funding increase for tribal justice
systems would not only promote sovereignty, but lower crime
rates.
That said, this proposal is not perfect in any respect. First,
from a philosophical standpoint, a proposal granting complete
241 This money could serve several purposes. It would allow greater training of
judges and advocates; more legal periodicals could be purchased; a more thorough
source of tribal court opinions could be developed; court reporters could be hired;
police could be hired and provided with equipment; and detailed studies of tribal
crime could be commissioned.





tribal autonomy in all affairs may be more appealing to some.
Second, this proposal may result in more gaming in the United
States;245 given that gaming generally operates as a regressive
tax, this too could be viewed as a cost. Third, tying Indian de-
velopment so closely to gaming could hurt those tribes located
in very rural areas that could not attract non-Indians to gaming
halls. 46 Finally, Indian tribes that have chosen not to have gam-
ing might feel compelled to offer it if alternate means of fund-
ing their tribal justice systems were not provided.
At the very least, however, this proposal presents a fresh al-
ternative for significant change in areas (tribal justice and eco-
nomic development) that have suffered for decades. The
potential costs are outweighed by the chief benefits of the pro-
posal: increased sovereignty for tribes, potentially lower crime
rates, and increased opportunity for tribal economic develop-
ment.
V. CONCLUSION
The early growth of the United States subjugated Indians
and forced them from their homes. Congress and the Supreme
Court, recognizing this problem, articulated legal standards that
made Indians' well-being a Congressional concern.
In the middle of the 2 0 'h century, as the United States at-
tained prominence on the international stage, Congress aban-
doned the theory that Indian reservations should remain
independent nations. It was in this atmosphere that Congress
enacted Public Law 280. During the past twenty years, however,
Congress and the executive branch have once again recognized
that tribes benefit from being both independent and strong.
The penultimate benefit of this movement would be to return
the exercise ofjustice to all tribes, while at the same time allow-
ing tribes to engage unfettered in the most viable export in the
history of reservations-gambling. Such a move would simul-
245 Gaming may increase as a whole because states would no longer be able to stifle
tribes' attempts at creating gaming facilities.
246 However, an amended IGRA could require gaming tribes to pay a certain per-
centage into a fund that is then distributed to non-gaming tribes. Such a system
would be similar to the current method the Federal Communications Commission
employs to guarantee telephone service to poor and rural areas.
247 Indian gaming revnues now top $8 billion. See Harold Henderson, CIcAGO
READER, Dec. 8, 2000, at Al, A44. (discussing the battle over the construction of a
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taneously restore adequate law enforcement and tribal justice
systems and thereby begin to undo the harms wrought by Public
Law 280.
Class Ill-type casino ninety miles from Chicago by the Pokagon band of Potowatomi
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Indians).
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